It is curious that a philosopher who one phenomenologist, Sartre, admits 'bowled' him over and who another, Merleau-Ponty, acknowledges 'bowled over philosophy' would receive such scant attention from phenomenologyboth in its emergence as the dominant discourse in continental philosophy and its persistence as such today.
1 Despite Bergson's immense popularity at the turn of the twentieth century, the French philosopher Péguy suggested as early as 1913 that his thought, or the fashionableness of it, was already in the process of dying. That is, it was clear that Bergson would leave behind no Bergsonian school; Bergson was dead, and European intellectuals had killed him, with a cultural 'vice grip' of sorts. Indeed, even 'the enemies of [Bergson's] enemies were ranged against him': Radical thinkers found Bergson's 'spiritualist' notion of freedom unsatisfying, while the Catholic Church indexed Bergson's writings in 1913 charging that his notion of the élan vital allegedly mixed human consciousness with revelation and privileged prideful, self-determining virtue over humility and grace.
2 Then began the period of the world wars, which for European intellectuals brought home the tragic dimension of human existence to which Bergson's 'optimistic' thought could not present a plausible response.
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What remained during the time of phenomenology's ascent to dominance in European philosophy, specifically in France, was 'two Bergsonisms,' as Merleau-Ponty noted:
There is that audacious one, when Bergson's philosophy fought and … fought well. And there is that one after the victory, persuaded in advance about what Bergson took a long time to find, and already provided with concepts while Bergson himself created his own. When Bergsonian insights are identified with the vague cause of spiritualism or some other entity, they lose their bite, they are generalized and minimized. another of Bergson's articulations of a problem, rather than his reformulations of problems and solutions, and either absorb his position or dismiss it. 5 One could argue that a curious feature, namely clarity, of Bergson's philosophy combined with the cultural factors cited above to contribute to his unhappy philosophical fate. Clarity in writing can condemn a philosopher to obscurity. It can encourage a superficial acceptance and diffusion of the thinker's system, or a superficial rejection and dismissal of it. Since the clear and plain lan guage of the arguments for which he fought was easily generalized into vague concepts -his elegant writing attempted to balance the poles of determinism and freedom, naturalism and mysticism, science and humanism, intellect and intuition, space and time -both fates associated with this curious feature of philosophy befell his thought.
6 And the increasing popularity and spread of phenomenology on the continent, which inherited this vague Bergson, seems largely responsible for condemning Bergson to philosophical obsolescence.
Yet the turn of the twenty-first century witnessed the appearance of a Bergsonian school of thought that did not emerge during Bergson's lifetime. This movement has sought primarily to revive Bergson's thought on its own terms, to look again and more seriously at what 'Bergson took a long time to find.' 7 After Bergson's philosophical fate, one path Bergsonism has taken toward realizing this revival has been to challenge the fundamental tenets of the movement that around 1920 succeeded Bergson as paramount in European or continental philosophy, that is, phenomenology. Sometimes the new Bergsonism's approach highlights and develops Bergson's differences with phenomenology; sometimes it attempts to redress phenomenology's misrepresentations of Bergson's thought. In any event, philosophers who today work in the continental tradition find themselves on the cusp of watching the history of Bergson's philosophical fate repeat itself -but now less out of cultural pressures and more as a result of the pressures and habits of our philosophical culture.
8 Whatever one thinks of the variant forms phenomenology takes now it remains the dominant discourse in continental philosophy, and while many popular alternatives to phenomenology exist today, 'Bergsonism' barely registers among them. Yet if there is a reason for accepting Bergson into the continental tradition today, one can make sense of it not only by reconsidering Bergson's unacknowledged influence on or undue neglect in phenomenology, but also by considering, in light of the revival of Bergson, how the 'concepts … Bergson himself created' now appear relevant for issues in contemporary research in phenomenology -even if Bergson's concepts are not 'phenomenological', and perhaps most importantly precisely because they are not.
From phenomenology and Bergson to Bergson and phenomenology
Early phenomenologists did not act alone in the campaign against Bergson. Mistreatment of Bergson at the hands of phenomenologists from the 1920s
